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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

SHERMAN V. LUND,
Plaintiff-Appellant)
vs.

No.

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

9835

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant brought an action against the respondent
company for damages to his real property as a result
of a gas leak occurring in the respondent's line where
the service line of the appellant joined the main line in
the street (R 1). Appellant alleged that respondent
was negligent in failing to bury its gas main at a sufficient depth in the street to guard against any damage
to the main or service line caused by traffic using the
1
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street. Appellant also contends that the portion of the
line where the break occurred was under the exclusive
control of the respondent and, therefore, relied upon
the doctrine of res ipso loquitur (R 5). A break occurred
in the gas main and thereafter, the leaking gas followed
the line of least resistance and entered the appellant's
property by following the service line. Natural gas
saturated a large portion of the appellant's property,
killing his lawn, shrubbery and fruit trees (Tr 13-29}.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant produced evidence concerning the location of the gas leak and the damage done to his property
and then rested his case ( Tr 5, 13-29, 82). The Court's
Pre-Trial Order states that the following are uncontroverted facts:
"A. Defendant had constructed, prior to 1958
and since that time has been in the business
under an exclusive franchise of furnishing
gas for fuel to residences and business establishments within the area involved, including plaintiff's residence.
"B. That the construction, operation and maintenance of the gas lines involved were for
all time herein under the exclusive control
of defendant.
"C. That the main transmission line from which
the gas escaped was constructed by defendant at the usual depth below ground surface
at which such lines are buried within the
area involved." ( R-5) .
2
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Respondent then, after inquiring as to whether or
not the Court was going to consider the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur and its application to the facts of the
case, moved the court for a dismissal ( Tr 83, 84) . The
Court took the motion under advisement and the following day, informed counsel for the parties that it
was the Court's opinion that there not not sufficient
evidence to go to the jury on the question of negligence
and that the Court felt that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply. The Court, then, granted respondent's motion (Tr 86). Counsel for the appellant
moved the Court for leave to re-open the case to present
further evidence on the question of negligence and
indicated to the Court what the evidence would be (Tr
86, 90, 91). The Court refused to permit the appellant
to re-open his case ( Tr 91 ) .

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower Court's
Order of Dismissal and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant is a resident of the City of Bountiful,
Utah. In the spring of 1958, he noticed that his lawn
and shrubbery, as well as other plant life in his yard,
were turning yellow and dying. This condition was
discovered after returning from a two-week vacation.
Mter several weeks of attempting to discover the reason
3
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for the condition, he finally discovered that there was
natural gas seeping from a leak in the gas main in the
street. The gas was following the service line to his
home, and had saturated the ground all around the
line. The natural gas became so dense in the ground
that it eventually killed the plant life ( Tr 13-29).
Appellant informed the gas company of the existence
of a leak. It was discovered at the junction of the service
line with the company's main line in the street (Tr 5).
Thereafter, the gas company made various tests on his
premises by penetrating the soil with a meter to test
the density of the gas. It was determined that the gas
was of such sufficient density that a large percentage
of the plant life on the property would probably die
( Tr 19, 20). Appellant, pursuant to the advice of
respondent's employees, saturated his premises with
water and cultivated wherever possible in an effort to
dissipate the gas and save his shrubbery, but he was
unsuccessful ( Tr 23) .
This action was brought to recover the damages to the property as a result of the leaking natural gas. At the trial of the case, the appellant produced testimony as to the depth of the gas main and
the fact that the leak had occurred causing damage to
his property (Tr 8, 9, 13-29). Thereafter, in reliance
upon the Pre-Trial Order concerning the uncontraverted facts of exclusive control, operation and maintenance of the gas lines by the company, he rested his
case. The Court, pursuant to the company's Motion
for dismissal, took under advisement the question of
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the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The following day, the Court informed counsel that
it was of the opinion that the doctrine did not apply
and that insufficient evidence had been produced at
that point to raise a question of negligence for the
jury's determination. The Court, then, granted the
company's Motion for Dismissal. Immediately thereafter, counsel for appellant moved for permission to
re-open to present further evidence to the Court on the
issue of negligence and the possible application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Counsel for the respondent
strenuously objected to a re-opening of the case (Tr
83-91). The jury was present as well as all of the
witnesses. The matter could have been handled with
dispatch and without prejudice to the company. The
Court indicated to counsel for the respondent that his
objection to re-opening of the case would very probably
only cause further delay in the matter (Tr 87). The
Court was persuaded not to allow the case to be reopened.

~,OR

POINTS URGED

REVERSAL

POINT I
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE, COUPLED
WITH THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER, RAISED
SUFFICIENT ISSUES OF FACT TO INVOKE
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
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POINT II
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO RE-OPEN HIS CASE WHERE NO
PREJUDICE WOULD HAVE RESULTED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE, COUPLED
WITH THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER, RAISED
SUFFICIENT ISSUES OF FACT TO INVOKE
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
The Pre-Trial Order specifically states that the
construction, operation and maintenance of the gas
lines involved were, at all times, under the exclusive
control of the gas company (R 5). Appellant's evidence clearly indicated that the gas line leaked, causing
his damage. In the case of Wightman vs. Mountain
Fuel Supply Cornpany, 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471,
this Honorable Court stated that in order to invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following must be
found:
"1. That the accident was of a kind which, in the

ordinary course of events, would not have
had due care been observed;
2. That it happened irrespective of any participation by the plaintiff; and
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3. That the cause thereof was something under

the management or control of the defendant
or for which it is responsible."
The facts in the instant case clearly indicate that
the conditions set forth in the above cited case have
been met by the appellant. Ordinarily, gas lines do not
leak if due care has been observed. The appellant did
not, in any way, participate in the cause of the leak.
The Pre-Trial Order clearly states that the line containing 'the gas was under the exclusive management
and control of the gas company for which it was responsible. Based upon the foregoing facts and evidence,
the appellant was entitled to have the issue of negligence
based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur submitted
to the jury. This doctrine was specifically made an issue
in the case in accordance with the Pre-Trial Order and
the appellant rightfully relied upon the doctrine and
its application to the facts. If the trial court, at the conclusion of appellant's case, decided, as it did, that the
doctrine should not be applied under the facts as presented, the appellant should have been allowed to present further evidence to the Court and jury on issues
of specific negligence as no possible prejudice would
have resulted.

POINT II
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IX REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO RE-OPEN HIS CASE WHERE NO
PREJUDICE WOULD HAVE RESULTED.
7
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The jury had not been dismissed ( Tr 86) . All of
the witnesses were present. No delay of any nature
whatsoever would have occurred in permitting the appellant to re-open. This Honorable Court stated in the
case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company vs. Wade~
Judge~ et al, 92 Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070,
"A motion to re-open the case for the purpose
of introducing further evidence is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, which will be
liberally exercised in behalf of allowing the whole
case to be presented . . . " (Italics ours.)
The appellant recognizes that a motion to re-open a
case is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. It is respectfully submitted that in exercising
such discretion, the trial court should liberally grant
such motions in a furtherance of justice, especially where
no prejudice will result to the opposing party. The
refusal to grant a party's motion to re-open is the exception rather than the rule. See 53 Am. J ur., Page 110,
Section 124, wherein the author states
"It is common practice for the trial court to
allow the case to be re-opened and additional
evidence introduced in order to prevent a nonsuit, where counsel for the plaintiff has omitted
evidence by accident, inadvertence, or even because of a mistake as to the necessity of offering
a particular witness or particular evidence."
In the instant case, counsel for the appellant was
under the impression that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was to be applied in the case and not until he
had been informed by the court that the doctrine was
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not going to be allowed did he consider it necessary to
offer further evidence. At this point, the appellant had
rested his case in reliance upon the doctrine. Counsel
for the respondent was also uncertain as to the application of the doctrine ( Tr 83). The trial court indicated
to counsel for respondent that perhaps appellant should
be allowed to re-open (Tr. 87, 88). It is further stated
in 53 Am. J ur., supra, as follows
"A refusal to re-open the case may be an abuse
of discretion, where the party has acted in good
faith, and where no prejudice would result to
the other party."
Generally, in those cases wherein the court denies
plaintiff the right to re-open, the evidence is such that
he could not prevail based upon his own contributory
negligence. In the case of Duncan vs. Western Refrigeration Company_, 11 Utah 2d 19, 354 P.2d 572, this
Honorable Court upheld the lower court's refusal to
allow a party to re-open. This case, unlike the instant
case, presented a situation wherein the party moving
to re-open was probably contributorily negligent based
upon the evidence already presented. The majority
opinion indicated that there was ample evidence on
which the jury could so find that would bar the plaintiff's recovery. For this reason, the majority of the court
refused to find that the lower court had abused its discretion in not allowing the case to be re-opened. In the
dissenting opinion of Justice Crockett, he states:
"Furthermore, even if the matter had only
been discretionary with the trial court, it seems

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to me that the exclusion of the evidence would
have been an abuse of discretion. The court's
duty is to exercise its discretion in favor of admitting all competent evidence offered in good
faith which has a bearing on the issue because
that is the only way the truth may be found and
justice done."
Appellant respectfully submits that in the instant
case, there was no evidence or issue of contributory negligence ( R 3) . The case was based solely upon the negligence or lack of negligence of the gas company in causing or allowing the gas to leak from its main onto the
appellant's property causing the damage in question.
The trial court had not indicated at the time of PreTrial nor at the time appellant introduced his evidence
that it was not going to allow the doctrine or res ipsa
loquitur to be applied. Based upon the assumption
that the doctrine would be allowed as per the Pre-Trial
Order, appellant rested his case. He was then informed
by the court that the doctrine was not applicable, and
a dismissal was granted. It is respectfully submitted
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
permit the case to be re-opened for the purpose of producing further evidence material to the issues of the
case. A previous jury had found the company negligent
and awarded damages accordingly. The matter was
then appealed to this Honorable Court and reversed as
a result of erroneous instructions. Supreme Court Case
No. 9389.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant presented sufficient evidence to raise
the issue of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and the lower court erred in refusing to apply
the doctrine. The lower court also erred in refusing
to permit the appellant to re-open his case after the
Court had informed him that it was not going to allow
the doctrine to apply. Immediately upon being so
informed by the Court, the motion to dismiss was granted. The appellant moved to re-open the case to present
further evidence. The record clearly shows that the
jury, witnesses, and all counsel were still present in the
courtroom. The case could have gone forward immediately without prejudice or delay to anyone. The tria]
court also indicated its concern about its authority to
allow the re-opening, but indicated to the respondent
that unnecessary delay might be caused by its failure
to do so. It is respectfully submitted that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does apply under the facts of the
instant case. The trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to permit appellant to re-open. Justice dictates
that the lower court's order dismissing appellant's complaint should be reversed and a new trial granted with
instructions to the lower court requiring the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Respectfully submitted,
Milton A. Oman
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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